Working papers
- Stéphan Sémirat, Selecting equilibria in single peaked, single crossing sender-receiver cheap talk games with finitely many types, November 2025
Publications
- Stéphan Sémirat, Françoise Forges, Converging better response dynamics in sender-receiver games, Mathematics of Operational Research, Forthcoming, 2025
- Christophe Bravard, Jacques Durieu, Jurjen Kamphorst, Sebastian Roché, Stéphan Sémirat, Should the police give priority to violence within criminal organizations? A personnel economics perspective, Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2023
- Christophe Bravard, Jacques Durieu, Sudipta Sarangi, Stéphan Sémirat, False information from near and far, Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 137, 2023, Pages 152-174
- Stéphan Sémirat, Françoise Forges, Strategic information transmission with sender’s approval: The single-crossing case, Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 134, 2022, Pages 242-263
- Stéphan Sémirat, Skewed information transmission: The effect of complementarities in a multi-dimensional cheap talk game, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Volume 161, 2019, Pages 1-19
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Stéphan Sémirat, Strategic information transmission despite conflict, International Journal of Game Theory, Volume 48, 2019, Pages 921-956
- Stéphan Sémirat, Cyclotomic Function Fields with Ideal Class Number One, Journal of Algebra, Volume 236, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 376-395
- Stéphan Sémirat, Class Number One Problem for Imaginary Function Fields: The Cyclic Prime Power Case, Journal of Number Theory, Volume 84, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 166-183